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Chapter 9
Discharge
KeyCiteL: Cases and other legal materials listed in KeyCite Scope can be
researched through the KeyCite service on WestlawL. Use KeyCite to
check citations for form, parallel references, prior and later history, and
comprehensive citator information, including citations to other decisions
and secondary materials.
VI. TENURE DENIAL AS A FORM OF DISCHARGE
§ 9:12 Generally
American academia has largely, though not universally,
adopted the institution of tenure. Tenure amounts to lifetime
employment after a lengthy probationary period, usually six
years, for teachers in higher education.1 Consequently, deci-
sions not to grant tenure provide the setting for some of the
most subtle and dicult cases where employment discrimina-
tion is alleged.
The institution of tenure developed in the early part of
this century through the eorts of organizations of educators.
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
has for decades worked to defend tenure to preserve aca-
demic freedom and economic security for professors.2 Under
conventions that have developed over the years, the tenure
[Section 9:12]
1At most institutions, tenure is accompanied by promotion from as-
sistant to associate professor, and those holding the ranks of ‘‘associate’’
or ‘‘full’’ professor are considered senior faculty. However, a few institu-
tions separate the tenure and promotion decisions, permitting a tenured
rank of assistant professor, while a few others grant the title of associate
professor to untenured faculty, often after a lateral transfer.
2In 1940 the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges (a
body representing undergraduate colleges and run by their top administra-
tors) jointly published the 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Ten-
ure, which has, along with commentaries and interpretations known as
‘‘recommended institutional regulations’’ (or RIRs) become a sort of consti-
tution against which the actions of academic institutions can be judged.
1
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decision is based on an evaluation of three areas: teaching,
scholarship, and service to the institution and profession
(the rst two are usually most important).
It is typical for departmental peers of the tenure candidate
to undertake the task of conducting an in-depth review of
the candidate's teaching, service and scholarship, often as-
sisted in the latter task by experts in the eld from outside
the candidate's institution. In many institutions, after such
a review, tenure recommendations issue from several levels,
including the candidate's department, college-wide and/or
university-wide faculty or faculty/administration commit-
tees, deans and other administrators, and the process
culminates in a nal decision by the president or board of
trustees. Many institutions include elaborate appeal proce-
dures of negative recommendations or decisions along the
way.3 Tenure, once acquired, generally means employment
until retirement or dismissal for cause, the latter but rarely
pressed.
Less technically viewed, tenure constitutes acceptance
into a particular profession. It denotes recognition by peers
in the profession that the scholar has attained a certain
level of seriousness and maturity; frequently, tenured profes-
sors will decline transfers to other institutions that do not
involve tenured appointments or at most a pro forma review
soon after arrival at the new institution. Accordingly, many
scholars view tenure denial as more than just a failure of
promotion or loss of a job; it usually means the scholar must
leave the institution within a year,4 and makes some scholars
consider leaving their profession altogether, especially if
The full text of the 1940 Statement and subsequent RIRs, as well as
advice about tenure matters, may be secured from the AAUP, One Dupont
Circle, Washington, D.C. See generally Metzger, Walter P., ‘‘Academic
Tenure in America: A Historical Essay,’’ in Faculty Tenure, San Francisco,
Jossey-Bass (1973), pp. 93-159. See also 53 Law and Contemporary
Problems, passim (Summer 1990) (special issue on the ftieth anniversary
of the 1940 Statement of Principles).
3Quite often, institutional rules restrict such appeals to cases alleg-
ing ‘‘procedural’’ irregularities, variously dened. Some institutions dene
‘‘procedural’’ narrowly; other include such matters as improper consider-
ation of race, sex, age or other inappropriate characteristics, or unfair ap-
plication of institutional regulations under the ‘‘procedural’’ rubric. The
breadth of the grounds of appeal may inuence a decision whether to
pursue internal remedies instead of or prior to litigation. See § 9:13.
4AAUP regulations adopted in a large portion of academia provide
that a professor's probationary period should not exceed seven years.
§ 9:12 Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation
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they have failed to secure the support of their peers. Even
where scholarly peers have praised the unsuccessful tenure
candidate's work, the stigma of tenure denial may derail or
end the candidate's career.
All too often, discrimination has played a role in a nega-
tive tenure decision. Proving this, under laws prohibiting
discrimination, and securing an appropriate remedy5 have
been exceedingly dicult for individuals challenging tenure
denials. This section discusses strategies for winning cases
where discrimination is alleged to have been a factor in the
denial of tenure.
§ 9:13 Choice of forum
Tenure cases are exceptionally dicult to win in court. Be-
tween 1972, when Title VII was extended to cover private
universities, and 1990, only a handful of individuals had
managed to prove they were denied tenure in violation of
Title VII.1Of these, not all emerged with tenure.2 Before
investing years of time, thousands of dollars, and untold
5Title VII and state law analogues are most frequently used to chal-
lenge tenure denials, but professors at public institutions have also
brought claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (denial of equal protection). See,
e.g., Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 50 Ed. Law Rep. 32, 48 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 395, 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 38398, 12 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d 994 (6th Cir. 1988). Suits may also be brought under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1981. See, e.g., Saunders v. George Washington University, 768
F. Supp. 854, 69 Ed. Law Rep. 337, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 42018
(D.D.C. 1991). Other, less frequently used causes of action arise under
state common law (e.g., breach of contract involving faculty manuals; mis-
representation if the facts warrant it) or under state or federal labor law if
a union contract exists. See Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 891
F.2d 337, 57 Ed. Law Rep. 761, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 815, 133
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2013, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2443, 52 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) ¶ 39497, 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 39707, 114 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
¶ 11840, 114 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 11841, 29 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 642 (1st Cir.
1989).
[Section 9:13]
1See Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 22 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 62, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 30674, 55 A.L.R. Fed.
806 (3d Cir. 1980); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 896 F.2d
865, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 599 (5th Cir. 1990); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d
1317, 50 Ed. Law Rep. 32, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 395, 48 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 38398, 12 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 994 (6th Cir. 1988); Brown
v. Trustees of Boston University, supra; Planells v. Howard University, 32
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 336, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 34089,
1983 WL 594 (D.D.C. 1983) (consent agreement).
§ 9:13Discharge
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emotional energy into an uncertain court suit, disappointed
tenure candidates should always consider other available
means of redress or reconsideration by an impartial body.
Appeals to an administration that has already said no may
not be fruitful, but access, such as through a grievance pro-
cedure, to a board of outside experts, an ad hoc faculty com-
mittee, or a labor arbitrator, may result in a favorable result,
either in the form of a decision binding on the institution, or
in the form of a nonbinding but politically inviolable
recommendation.3In fact, one court has recently held that at-
torneys' fees are available pursuant to Title VII for work
done in a state university's appeals procedure.4 Another op-
tion is to litigate in the less formal setting of state adminis-
trative bodies charged with enforcing state antidiscrimina-
tion statutes.
The decision whether to pursue such private or administra-
tive procedures instead of a court action turns on a host of
factors, some legal and some political: What opportunity is
there for input into selection of new decision-makers or
arbitrators? What will their powers be? Will the newly
involved decision-maker or recommending body be truly in-
dependent? What evidence may be discovered or considered?
Will the institution be compelled to follow a favorable recom-
mendation, either by its own rules, or in response to political
realities? Does pursuit of a grievance or appeal foreclose
(practically or otherwise) later resort to the courts? What re-
course exists if the institution declines to follow its own
procedures?
Even if ling a grievance does not seem promising, the
faculty member must face the dicult question of what
It is noteworthy that two of these cases (Ford and Planells) involved
white males; the other three involved white females. For the time period
1970–84, two researchers who made an exhaustive survey counted 42 ten-
ure discrimination cases decided on the merits, see LaNoue and Lee,
Academics in Court, University of Michigan Press, 1987, table 1. Only in
Kunda, supra, did the plainti prevail in the years surveyed.
2See, § 9:16 on remedies.
3See, e.g., Swift, Becoming a Plainti, 4 Berkeley Women's L.J. 245
(1980–90) (tenure grievance settled by referral of case to outside review
committee which recommended tenure; institution implemented
recommendation).
4See Duello v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System,
170 Wis. 2d 27, 487 N.W.2d 56, (Wis. App. 1992) (nonretention of faculty
member into tenure review year).
§ 9:13 Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation
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nancial, emotional, familial and collegial resources he or
she has available, as these will likely be strained to the limit
in the course of a court battle.5If tenure is the goal, and
some sort of meaningful, independent, de novo review is
available outside the court system, the faculty member would
be wise to utilize it if at all possible.6 The only category of
case better tried in court is one heavily dependent on evi
dence available only in that forum, such as a case based on
access to condential materials that the institution refuses
to disclose and that are unavailable to the faculty member
through other means.
§ 9:14 Proving the case—Discovery
The typical academic employer's response to charges that
it discriminated in denying tenure is that nothing of the sort
occurred, that it was merely exercising institutional aca-
demic freedom—which, the institution will doubtless remind
the court, includes the right to ‘‘determine for itself, on aca-
demic grounds, who may teach’’1—and that for reasons best
known to itself, the tenure candidate simply did not stack
up. Variations on this theme include the refrain that al-
though the tenure candidate had strong peer support, ‘‘rea-
sonable minds can dier’’ about such intangibles as aca-
demic quality, promise or creativity; or, conversely, that
since the candidate's peers did not support the candidate,
her or his work is decient in quality; or that standards are
rising and the institution has a right to improve itself; or
that while the candidate's teaching was excellent, her or his
5See, e.g., Academics in Court, supra, passim.
6Courts tend to defer unduly to the ‘‘academic judgment’’ asserted by
institutions of higher learning as grounds for denying tenure to faculty
members. See, e.g., Kumar v. Board of Trustees, University of Massachusetts,
774 F.2d 1, 12, 27 Ed. Law Rep. 1051, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1734, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 35533 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1097 (1986) (‘‘the district court . . . is [not] empowered to sit as a
super tenure board. . .. Courts must be extremely wary of intruding into
the world of university tenure decisions. These decisions necessarily hinge
on subjective judgments regarding . . . factors that are not susceptible of
quantitative measurement’’). Scholars practiced in peer evaluation are
unlikely to so defer to an institution's initial tenure decision.
[Section 9:14]
1From Justice Frankfurter's celebrated concurring opinion in Sweezy
v. State of N.H. by Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 263, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d
1311 (1957).
§ 9:14Discharge
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scholarship was decient (or the reverse); or that the institu-
tion could not have discriminated since it employs so many
members of the faculty member's sex, race, or ethnicity. In
making this sort of argument, the institution will seek to
elicit a deferential attitude from the court that will defeat all
claims not supported with ‘‘smoking gun’’ evidence.2 To
counter the factnder's anticipated deference, the faculty
plainti must show the institution's position to be insupport-
able, by all available means.
No matter what the strengths and weaknesses of the case,
the plainti will invariably have to make the point that the
issue is not whether he or she has faults, or could have done
more, measured against an abstract Olympian concept of
excellence, since everyone has faults and falls short of an
absolute standard. Rather, the issue is whether he or she
met the standards for the award of tenure at the defendant
institution.3
Showing that the plainti did so requires perseverance
2The conventional wisdom is that academic personnel are too sophis-
ticated to make blatantly sexist or racist remarks. However, this view
underestimates the insensitivity of at least some university teachers and
administrators. See, e.g., Jew v. University of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946, 64
Ed. Law Rep. 84, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 647, 55 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) ¶ 40443 (S.D. Iowa 1990) (promotion denial and sexual harass-
ment case).
3To make out a prima facie case of discrimination in the tenure
context, a plainti must show that she was a member of a protected class;
that she was qualied for tenure in the sense that a decision awarding
tenure would have been a reasonable exercise of discretion; that despite
her qualications she was rejected; and that tenure positions were being
awarded at the institution at the time the plainti was denied. See Fields
v. Clark University, 817 F.2d 931, 934, 39 Ed. Law Rep. 43, 43 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1247, 43 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 37141 (1st Cir. 1987).
Fields cites to and restates the formulation stated in Banerjee v. Board of
Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1155–56 (D. Mass. 1980),
judgment a'd, 648 F.2d 61, 62–63 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1098 (1981). There, the connection to the defendant institution's particu-
lar standards is explicit. The second prong of the prima facie case is stated
as a requirement of a showing ‘‘that plainti was a candidate for tenure
and was qualied under the particular college's standards, practices and
customs.’’ The court further explained that the plainti need show only
that her qualications ‘‘were at least sucient to place [her] in the middle
group of tenure candidates as to whom both a decision granting tenure
and a decision denying tenure could be justied as a reasonable exercise
of discretion by the tenure-decision making body.’’ See also discussion in
Powell v. Syracuse University, 580 F.2d 1150, 1154–56, 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1316, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 8468 (2d Cir. 1978).
§ 9:14 Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation
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and creativity in discovery. Very few institutions utilize
objectively measurable standards for tenure (e.g., a strict
count of publications or of students or courses taught), nor
would such a system be desirable, since obviously quality
and quantity of eort should be considered. But assessments
of quality are permeated by subjective judgment; the chal-
lenge to the plainti is to show the subjectivity was actually
bias rather than a simple dierence of opinion.
Where the institution asserts that the candidate's scholar
ship lacks creativity, says nothing new, or the like, the
plainti should see how other individuals with similar re-
cords fared. Now that the EEOC's right to condential peer
materials is established,4 the plainti in any court action
should seek such materials in discovery,5 involving both his
or her own and other tenure candidates' cases.6To prevail,
the plainti must discover in the les of reasonably contem-
porary successful tenure candidates who are not in the same
protected class, comments at least as critical or praise no
stronger than is found in plainti's own le. Or plainti can
show her le to be stronger overall than those of other, more
successful candidates, giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. To this end, the plainti should scrutinize all
departmental and other recommendations regarding his or
her case from inside the institution and compare them with
those of previous successful tenure candidates from the same
or other departments.7
Letters from outside experts often provide useful
4See University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 110 S. Ct.
577, 107 L. Ed. 2d 571, 57 Ed. Law Rep. 666, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1118, 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 39539, 28 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.
1169, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 369 (1990).
5Some defendants will undoubtedly argue that University of Pennsyl-
vania applies only to agency subpoenas for documents, not to discovery
requests by individuals. However, the language of the case is so broad,
and its rejection of such shibboleths as an institution's academic freedom
privilege so unequivocal, that such defendants' eorts should not succeed.
6The AAUP has now endorsed a policy permitting broad access to
relevant documents and les both generally and in the specic case of
internal university review of discrimination complaints. See On Process-
ing Complaints of Discrimination and Access to Faculty Personnel Files,
in Academe, July–August 1992, at pp. 19–23 and 24–28, respectively.
These policies may be cited as a statement of developing norms in the
profession for purposes of internal university appeals.
7The entire le, and the les of similarly situated but successful
peers, should be scrutinized regardless of whether the negative tenure
§ 9:14Discharge
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ammunition. The plainti may nd that the negative deci-
sion in his or her case rests on a quotation out of context or
a lone negative remark in one of a dozen letters, whereas
the fair-haired boy of a year previous received scathing and
repeated criticism which the same university decision-
makers chose to overlook. The plainti might nd something
as simple as a requirement that he or she produce a larger
quantity of publications than was required of other candi-
dates, or that his or her total number of publications
exceeded in number and prestige of publication those of
previous candidates.8
In reading letters of evaluation, one should be aware that
those who write them utilize what amounts almost to a code.
Overt criticism can usually be taken at face value, but words
of praise fall into distinct categories. At some institutions it
is sucient to be ‘‘hard-working,’’ ‘‘thorough,’’ ‘‘interesting’’
or ‘‘competent’’ to earn tenure; at others, ‘‘insightful and
creative’’ may not even suce, and ‘‘brilliant,’’ ‘‘dazzling’’
and ‘‘the best of her generation’’ may be required. A faculty
interpreter serving as an expert witness may be necessary.
In institutions where tenure candidates' published work is
typically reviewed in the professional literature, it may be
helpful to compare published reviews of the plainti's work
with those of successful tenure candidates. An expert can as-
sist here to translate technical jargon and to assess the
professional stature of reviewers.
In an institution that does not use outside evaluations,
but which nonetheless considers scholarship in the tenure
decision, the plainti will do well to solicit comparative
outside reviews of him or herself and others, again through
an expert. That individual could be asked to compare the
plainti's work to that of recent tenure recipients, with a
view towards showing that the institution judged the
plainti by a higher standard.
If the institution denied tenure on the grounds of insuf-
ciently excellent teaching, the same sort of comparative
data described above in the context of scholarship should be
recommendation occurred at the departmental level or later in the pro-
cess.
8Shifting criteria should arouse suspicion. See, e.g., Bachman v.
Board of Trustees of University of District of Columbia, 777 F. Supp. 990,
71 Ed. Law Rep. 453, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1692, 60 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 42069 (D.D.C. 1991) (promotion case).
§ 9:14 Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation
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examined. If it seems inescapable that the plainti scored
lower on numerical student evaluations, the legitimacy of
those evaluations as a measure of teaching quality should be
investigated. A growing body of literature suggests that such
numerical evaluation devices reect societal prejudices, es-
pecially with regard to women.9Unfortunately, peer visits
are also suspect.10
Other members of the plainti's protected class should be
surveyed for anecdotes of prejudiced actions or remarks. In
many jurisdictions, such evidence is permitted to show a
discriminatory environment or to bolster inferences of
discrimination.11
Finally, if the plainti is in a eld such as women's stud-
9See, e.g., Martin, Elaine, Power and Authority in the Classroom:
Sexist Stereotypes in Teaching Evaluations, Signs, pp. 482–492, Spring
1984; Basow, S.A. and Silberg, N.T., Student Evaluations of College
Professors: Are Female and Male Professors Rated Dierently?, 79 J. of
Educational Psychology 308–14 (1987); Bennett, S.K., Student Perceptions
of and Expectations for Male and Female Instructors: Evidence Relating
to Questions of Gender Bias in Teaching Evaluations, 74 J. of Educational
Psychology 170–79 (1982).
10See Lewis, Lionel, Scaling the Ivory Tower: Merit and Its Limits in
Academic Careers, John Hopkins University Press, 1975.
11See, e.g., Brown, 891 F.2d at 349–350 (district court did not abuse
discretion by allowing introduction of later derogatory remarks by
university president about another member of plainti's protected class);
see generally (non-tenure cases): U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 75 L. Ed. 2d 403, 31 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 609, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 33477, 13 Fed.
R. Evid. Serv. 1368 (1983) (successful showing of discriminatory intent
does not require direct evidence); Krieger v. Gold Bond Bldg. Products, a
Div. of National Gypsum Co., 863 F.2d 1091, 1096–97, 48 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1050, 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 38550, 27 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. 506 (2d Cir. 1988) (‘‘discriminatory intent . . . may be proven
through evidence of past conduct or incidents’’); Conway v. Electro Switch
Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 43 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 37264, 23 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1024 (1st Cir. 1987),
certied question answered, 402 Mass. 385, 523 N.E.2d 255, 49 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243, 47 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 38384, 74 A.L.R.4th
737 (1988) (circumstantial evidence of discriminatory atmosphere relevant
to question of motive in individual case); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1423, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 721, 41
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 36417, 21 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 188 (7th Cir. 1986)
(‘‘[g]iven the diculty of proving employment discrimination . . . a at
rule that evidence of other discriminatory acts by or attributable to the
employer can never be admitted . . . would be unjustied’’); Morris v.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 702 F.2d 1037, 1045, 31
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 169, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 33469, 12
§ 9:14Discharge
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ies or African American studies, and the plainti's eld of
expertise is itself the subject of criticism or contemptuous
remarks by those making a negative recommendation or de-
cision, these too may constitute evidence of discrimination.12
§ 9:15 Tactical considerations and common pitfalls
Almost as common as the defensive claim of institutional
academic freedom, certain defense tactics turn up in tenure
cases like clockwork. Predictably, claims of untimeliness top
the list.
The lead case in this area is not new. In Ricks v. Delaware
State College,1 the Supreme Court made clear that the date
which begins the Title VII clock's ticking is the date the fac-
ulty member learned of the decision of the nal authority in
the tenure chain, typically either the institution's board of
trustees or president. The clock does not stop for Title VII
purposes if the tenure candidate undertakes an appeal, no
matter how elaborate, nor does it wait until the tenure
candidate's last day of work. If there is any chance a disap-
pointed tenure candidate may wish to resort to the courts,
he or she should be sure to le a timely administrative
charge.2
Institutional defendants generally, and academic institu-
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1947 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (‘‘t]he question of the legitimacy
of the employer's motivation in ring the employee . . . is one upon which
the past acts of the employer have some bearing’’).
12See, e.g. Lynn v. Regents of University of California, 656 F.2d 1337,
1343, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1391, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 410, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 32149 (9th Cir. 1981) (‘‘disdain
for women's issues, and a diminished opinion of those who concentrate on
those issues, is evidence of a discriminatory attitude towards women’’).
But see also the disapproval of such evidence in Brown, 891 F.2d at 351
(regarding Women's Studies department funding), and in Langland v.
Vanderbilt University, 589 F. Supp. 995, 1006, 19 Ed. Law Rep. 533, 36
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), decision a'd, 772
F.2d 907, 27 Ed. Law Rep. 682, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 163 (6th
Cir. 1985) (same).
[Section 9:15]
1Ricks v. Delaware State College, 605 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 444 U.S. 1070, 100 S. Ct. 1012, 62 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1980) and
judgment rev'd, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S. Ct. 498, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1980).
2Some courts will toll the statute of limitations where an institution
has failed to post required notices regarding laws prohibiting discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Linn v. Andover Newton Theological School, 642 F. Supp.
11, 34 Ed. Law Rep. 1022, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 814, 2 I.E.R.
§ 9:14 Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation
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tions in particular, have adopted a second popular litigation
tactic: seeking to stymie the plainti's discovery by insisting
that all institutional employees are somehow alter-egos for
the institutional defendant, and that plainti's counsel will
violate the legal code of ethics by seeking to interview these
employees ex parte (outside the presence of defendant's
counsel).3 This argument rests on Disciplinary Rule
7-104(A)(1) of the ABA Code of Ethics, which prohibits
counsel for a party from contacting any other party involved
in the matter that is the subject of the rst counsel's repre-
sentation if that lawyer knows the second party is repre-
sented by another lawyer. The practical eect of the ethical
rule is to compel plainti's counsel to forego informal
discovery and investigation and to use depositions to gather
evidence. In a tenure case this can be devastatingly expen-
sive, since virtually all key witnesses are university
employees. It also permits defendant's counsel to discover
the plainti's case to his or her detriment.
The matter has been much litigated generally. Fortunately
for plaintis, most courts have read the disciplinary rule
narrowly to apply only to top decision-makers in an
institution. In the tenure context, the one court that has ad-
dressed the matter head-on has permitted ex parte contact
with faculty who served on various tenure review
bodies.4However, Morrison has not stopped defendant's
counsel from using the tactic to intimidate plaintis and
cause them additional expense.
On the plainti's side, two current tactical developments
bear comment. The rst is the matter of trying a case to a
jury rather than a judge. Prior to the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, plaintis in tenure cases making claims
under Title VII could secure jury trials only if they taught at
state-funded universities that could be sued under 42
Cas. (BNA) 1268 (D. Mass. 1985) (failure to post agency notice tolls stat-
ute of limitations in age discrimination case involving dismissal of tenured
faculty member).
3See § 14:41 for a full discussion of this issue.
4Baker v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 125 F.R.D. 25, 48 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 304, 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 38589 (D. Conn.
1988). Other cases involving faculty matters, albeit not tenure, which
grant broad ex parte access to university employees, are Siguel v. Trustees
of Tufts College, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 697, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) ¶ 39775, 1990 WL 29199 (D. Mass. 1990) and Sobel v. Yeshiva
University, 23 E.P.D. 32,479 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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U.S.C.A. § 1983, or if they could add a pendent common law
claim entailing a jury trial right. Signicantly, in at least
two such cases, the jury ruled for the plainti while the
judge ruled for the institution on the Title VII claim.5
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 extended the jury trial right
to all Title VII plaintis seeking legal relief. However, in
cases predicated on events pre-dating that change in law,
alternate bases for a jury trial should be sought since the
retroactive application of the new law is uncertain.
The second recent development that tenure case plaintis
should keep in mind is the Supreme Court's ruling in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.6 Price Waterhouse (now enshrined in
Title VII pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991) extended
to Title VII cases the shifting burdens of proof discussed in
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Education v. Doyle.7
In the tenure context, it is often dicult to decide whether
to pursue a mixed-motive or a pretext strategy. The decision
turns on the strength of the various pieces of evidence in the
particular case, and how central to the tenure decision are
any blatant instances of discrimination. Fortunately, as the
Supreme Court made clear, a plainti need not make this
strategic decision at the outset of the litigation.8
5See, e.g., Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 50 Ed. Law Rep. 32, 48
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 395, 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 38398, 12
Fed. R. Serv. 3d 994 (6th Cir. 1988) (jury found for plaintis on § 1983
claim, while court improperly ignored jury verdict to rule for institution
on Title VII claim); Hooker v. Tufts University, 581 F. Supp. 98, 16 Ed.
Law Rep. 1133, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 278 (D. Mass. 1983) (jury
verdict for plainti on contract claim; court rules no Title VII violation in
denial of tenure). Because of judges' observed tendency to identify with
the typically white, male leaders of corporations and other institutions,
discrimination plaintis tend to fare better with juries (though even there
the set of successful plaintis is very small). See generally Bartholet,
Elizabeth, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
945 (1982).
6Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L.
Ed. 2d 268 (1989).
7Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). According to Mt. Healthy, once the
plainti in a case involving a mixture of legitimate and unlawful motives
demonstrates that impermissible factors contributed to the defendant's
adverse decision, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it would
have made the same decision absent the discrimination.
8Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1789, n.12. Regardless of which
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§ 9:16 Tenure as a remedy
Since 1972 in only ve reported cases have plaintis
surmounted the barriers to proving that their institution
discriminated in denying them tenure. One would expect,
given the extreme diculty of demonstrating liability, that
these few prevailing plaintis would secure tenure as a mat-
ter of courts' unquestioned right to order ‘‘make-whole’’ relief.
How else but through an award of tenure can a faculty
member denied tenure be made whole?
But some courts are uneasy imposing their will even on an
institution guilty of discrimination. Preferring to view the
acts of discrimination as an aberration rather than as part
of a pattern endemic to academia, they reinstate the plainti
in an untenured status and remand the case to the institu-
tion so that a dierent set of presumably less biased
individuals will make a de novo review of the candidate's
credentials.1
Other courts (those in Kunda, Brown and Planells)2can be
called upon as authority for the appropriateness of tenure as
a remedy. Brown in particular is signicant because the
institution there specically disputed the quality of Brown's
scholarly work (unlike, e.g., Kunda, where even the defen-
dant conceded the plainti was qualied though she lacked a
required degree).3 But Brown may be limited to its own facts,
since such a strong majority of the outside experts in Brown's
eld, as well as an overwhelming majority of faculty evalua-
tors (who numbered some forty individuals) supported a ten-
ure award for her, against three administrators without
route (pretext or mixed motive) the plainti follows, she must rst estab-
lish a prima facie case.
[Section 9:16]
1See, e.g., Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1333 (tenure should be awarded by
the court ‘‘only in the most exceptional cases . . . [w]hen the court is
convinced that a plainti reinstated to her former faculty position could
not receive fair consideration . . . of her tenure application’’); Ford, 896
F.2d at 875–76 (same).
2See § 9:12.
3Indeed, in what may further down the road be revealed as overstate-
ment, Brown has been hailed as ‘‘the realization of Title VII's legislative
intent’’ which ‘‘will have a signicant impact on Title VII litigation.’’
Brammen, J., Lallo, D. and Ney, S., 17 J.C. & U.L. 551–63 (1991).
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advanced training in her eld. Brown may be just the sort of
exceptional case the Gutzwiller court had in mind.4
Developments in other employment settings may actually
be more helpful to tenure plaintis than the rare successful
tenure case. When courts declare themselves willing to upset
negative partnership decisions regarding, for example,
partnership candidates at accounting rms, and to order
promotion to partnership in those settings, they thereby
breach barriers almost as forbidding as the ivied walls of
academe.5
4See the plainti's brief to the Supreme Court in Brown opposing
Boston University's certiorari petition, wherein the facts of Brown are
distinguished from those in Gutzwiller.
5See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 52 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1275, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1499, 53 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 39922 (D.D.C. 1990), judgment a'd, 920 F.2d 967, 54
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 750, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 40413
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (award of partnership to manager on remand).
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Chapter 13
Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss and
for Summary Judgment
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researched through the KeyCite service on WestlawL. Use KeyCite to
check citations for form, parallel references, prior and later history, and
comprehensive citator information, including citations to other decisions
and secondary materials.
§ 13:17 Collective bargaining agreements arbitration
clauses
The Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision in 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett,1 held that a provision in a collective-bargaining
agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union
members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a mat-
ter of federal law. Since the union in this case refused to
take it members' claim of age discrimination to arbitration,
the Court's ruling eectively denied the union members a
forum to challenge their employer's alleged adverse action.
Signicantly, the Court declined to resolve the respondents'
claim that the CBA allowed the Union to prevent them from
eectively vindicating their federal statutory rights in the
arbitral forum, because that question required resolution of
contested factual allegations that were not fully briefed and
not fairly encompassed within the question presented.2
Justice Souter's dissent highlighted that “ . . . the majority
opinion may have little eect, for it explicitly reserves the
question whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial forum is en-
forceable when the union controls access to and presentation
of employees' claims in arbitration, which ‘is usually the
[Section 13:17]
114 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 173 L. Ed. 2d 398, 105
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1441, 186 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2065, 92 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 43507, 157 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 11208 (2009).
22009 WL 838159 at *16.
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case.’ ’’ This issue is likely to be hotly contested in future lit-
igation where a union declines to arbitrate a member's statu-
tory discrimination claim.
The Respondents in this case were members of the Service
Employees International Union, Local 32BJ (Union) and
were employed as night lobby watchmen and in other simi-
lar capacities by Temco Service Industries, Inc. (Temco), a
maintenance service and cleaning contractor. The Union was
the exclusive bargaining representative of employees within
the building-services industry in New York City, which
includes building cleaners, porters, and doorpersons. The
Union had exclusive authority to bargain on behalf of its
members over their “rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment,” and engaged in
industry-wide collective bargaining with the Realty Advisory
Board on Labor Relations, Inc. (RAB), a multiemployer
bargaining association for the New York City real-estate
industry. The agreement between the Union and the RAB
was contained in their Collective Bargaining Agreement for
Contractors and Building Owners (CBA). The CBA required
union members to submit all claims of employment discrimi-
nation to binding arbitration under the CBA's grievance and
dispute resolution procedures.
Petitioner 14 Penn Plaza LLC was a member of the RAB
and owned and operated the New York City oce building
where the Respondents worked. After 14 Penn Plaza, with
the Union's consent, engaged a unionized security contractor
aliated with Temco to provide licensed security guards for
the building, the respondents were reassigned to jobs as
porters and cleaners. These reassignments led to a loss in
income and were less desirable than their former positions.
Respondents asked the Union to le grievances alleging,
among other things, that petitioners violated the CBA's ban
on workplace discrimination by reassigning respondents on
the basis of their age in violation of Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).3 The Union requested
arbitration under the CBA, but after the initial hearing,
withdrew the age-discrimination claims on the ground that
its consent to the new security contract precluded it from
objecting to respondents' reassignments as discriminatory.
Respondents then led a complaint with the EEOC alleging
that petitioners had violated their ADEA rights, and the
329 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq.
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EEOC issued each of them a right-to-sue notice. They then
led a civil action in federal district court, which denied
petitioners' motion to compel arbitration of respondents' age
discrimination claims. The Second Circuit armed, holding
that Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,4 forbids enforcement
of collective-bargaining provisions requiring arbitration of
ADEA claims. The Gardner-Denver decision is discussed
below.
The court examined the two federal statutes at issue here,
the ADEA and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
and for the Court yielded a straightforward answer to the
question presented. It found that the Union and the RAB,
negotiating on behalf of 14 Penn Plaza, collectively bargained
in good faith and agreed that employment-related discrimi-
nation claims, including ADEA claims, would be resolved in
arbitration. Therefore, this negotiated contractual term
qualied as a “conditio[n] of employment” subject to manda-
tory bargaining under the NLRA.5 Since a union may agree
to the inclusion of an arbitration provision in a collective-
bargaining agreement in return for other concessions from
the employer, the Court determined that the CBA's arbitra-
tion provision must be honored unless the ADEA itself
removes this particular class of grievances from the NLRA's
broad sweep.6 Finding that it did not do so, it noted that the
Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.7 held that
the ADEA does not preclude arbitration of claims brought
under the statute. It therefore concluded that there is no
legal basis for the Court to strike down the arbitration clause
in this CBA.
The Court had to square its ruling with the Gardner-
4Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 147, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
¶ 9148 (1974).
529 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). See, e.g., Litton Financial Printing Div., a Div.
of Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 199, 111 S. Ct.
2215, 115 L. Ed. 2d 177, 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
¶ 10747 (1991).
614 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 173 L. Ed. 2d 398, 105
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1441, 186 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2065, 92 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43507, 157 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 11208 (2009). (citation
omitted).
7Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26–33, 111
S. Ct. 1647, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1116, 56
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 40704 (1991).
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Denver line of cases. Respondents argued that Gardner-
Denver and its progeny held that an agreement to arbitrate
ADEA claims provided for in a collective-bargaining agree-
ment cannot waive an individual employee's right to a
judicial forum under federal antidiscrimination statutes. In
reviewing the facts underlying Gardner-Denver and its prog-
eny, it interpreted the facts as revealing a narrow scope of
the legal rule they engendered, noting those cases “did not
involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims,” but “the quite dierent issue
whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded
subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims.”8 Thus,
the Court concluded that Gardner-Denver did not control the
outcome where, as here, the collective-bargaining agree-
ment's arbitration provision expressly covered both statutory
and contractual discrimination claims.
The Court recognized that the Gardner-Denver line of
cases included broad dicta highly critical of using arbitration
to vindicate statutory antidiscrimination rights. However, it
found that view was based on what it termed a misconceived
view of arbitration that the Court has since abandoned.9
Further, it stated that the decision to resolve ADEA claims
by way of arbitration instead of litigation is not tantamount
to a waiver of the statutory right to be free from workplace
age discrimination, but waives only the right to seek relief
from a court in the rst instance.10 Second, the majority
noted that Gardner-Denver’s “mistaken suggestion” that
certain informal features of arbitration made it a forum “well
suited to the resolution of contractual disputes,” but “a com-
paratively inappropriate forum for the nal resolution of
814 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 173 L. Ed. 2d 398, 105
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1441, 186 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2065, 92 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43507, 157 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 11208 (2009), citing
Gilmer, at 35.
92009 WL 838159, citing 415 U.S. at 51. Justice Souter in dissent
responded to this statement: “ I agree that Gardner-Denver's “ ‘mistrust of
the arbitral process’ . . . has been undermined by our recent arbitration
decisions,” but if the statements are “dicta,” their obsolescence is as irrele-
vant to Gardner-Denver's continued vitality as their currency was to the
case's holding when it came down; in Gardner-Denver itself we acknowl-
edged “the federal policy favoring arbitration,” , but nonetheless held that
a union could not waive its members' statutory right to a federal forum in
a CBA. 2009 WL 838159 *10, note 3 (citations omitted).
102009 WL 838159, citing Gilmer, at 26.
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[employment] rights.”11 has been corrected.12 Third, the Court
rejected Gardner-Denver’s concern that, in arbitration, a
union may subordinate an individual employee's interests to
the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining
unit,13 “cannot be relied on to introduce a qualication into
the ADEA that is not found in its text.” Moreover, the Court
termed the conict-of-interest argument was an unsustain-
able collateral attack on the NLRA, which Congress, in its
view accounted for the conict in several ways, including
that 1) union members may bring a duty of fair representa-
tion claim against the union,14 2) a union can be subjected to
direct liability under the ADEA if it discriminates on the
basis of age,15 and 3) union members may also le age-
discrimination claims with the EEOC and the National
Labor Relations Board.16
Signicantly, the Court declined to resolve the respondents'
claim that the CBA allowed the Union to prevent them from
eectively vindicating their federal statutory rights in the
arbitral forum because that question required resolution of
contested factual allegations that were not fully briefed and
not fairly encompassed within the question presented.
Respondents argued that the CBA operates as a substantive
waiver of their ADEA rights because it not only precludes a
federal lawsuit, but also allows the Union to block arbitra-
tion of these claims. Petitioners contested this characteriza-
tion of the CBA, oering record evidence suggesting that the
Union allowed respondents to continue with the arbitration
even though the Union has declined to participate. “Thus,
although a substantive waiver of federally protected civil
rights will not be upheld, we are not positioned to resolve in
the rst instance whether the CBA allows the Union to
prevent respondents from “eectively vindicating” their
“federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”17
Justice Stevens, dissented, noting rst that he joined
11415 U.S. at 56.
122009 WL 838159, citing Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 232, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 96 L. Ed. 2d 185, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 93265, R.I.C.O. Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) ¶ 6642 (1987).
13415 U.S. at 58, n. 19.
142009 WL 838159 at *14.
152009 WL 838159 at *15.
162009 WL 838159 at *15.
172009 WL 838159 at *16.
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Justice Souter's dissent which he noted explains why the
Court's decision in Gardner-Denver Co., answers the ques-
tion presented in this case dierently from the majority
decision. However, he wrote to articulate his concern regard-
ing the “Court's subversion of precedent to the policy favor-
ing arbitration prompts these additional remarks.”18
Justice Souter dissented joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Beryer. Noteworthy, he highlighted that “. . .
the majority opinion may have little eect, for it explicitly
reserves the question whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial
forum is enforceable when the union controls access to and
presentation of employees' claims in arbitration, which ‘is
usually the case.’ ’’19 Nevertheless, he found that the major-
ity's opinion cannot be “reconciled with the Gardner-Denver
Court's own view of its holding, repeated over the years and
generally understood . . . .”20
Justice Souter extensively reviewed the Court's Gardner-
Denver decision which considered the eect of a CBA's
arbitration clause on an employee's right to sue under Title
VII and unanimously held that “the rights conferred” by
Title VII (with no exception for the right to a judicial forum)
cannot be waived as “part of the collective bargaining
process.” Justice Souter noted that the Court had contrasted
two categories of rights in labor and employment law, includ-
ing “statutory rights related to collective activity,” which
“are conferred on employees collectively to foster the
processes of bargaining[, which] properly may be exercised
or relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining agent
to obtain economic benets for union members,” and “Title
VII . . . [which] stands on plainly dierent [categorical]
ground because “it concerns not majoritarian processes, but
an individual's right to equal employment opportunities.”
Thus, Justice Souter concluded that the Gardner-Denver
Court imposed a “seemingly absolute prohibition of union
waiver of employees' federal forum rights.”21 Moreover,
Justice Souter found that Gardner-Denver “held that an in-
dividual's statutory right of freedom from discrimination and
182009 WL 838159 at *17.
192009 WL 838159 citing Gardner-Denver, at 51.
202009 WL 838159 at *23.
212009 WL 838159 citing Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,
525 U.S. 70, 80, 119 S. Ct. 391, 142 L. Ed. 2d 361, 8 A.D. Cas. (BNA)
1429, 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2769, 1999 A.M.C. 201 (1998).
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access to court for enforcement were beyond a union's power
to waive.”
Further, Justice Souter both found that the majority
evaded the precedent of Gardner-Denver ignoring it as long
as it could and when the majority did speak to Gardner-
Denver, it misread the case in claiming that it turned solely
“on the narrow ground that the arbitration was not preclu-
sive because the collective-bargaining agreement did not
cover statutory claims.”22
Justice Souter was critical of the majority's assurance that
a union member is able to protect himself against union
discrimination by availing himself to a duty of fair represen-
tation claim.23 He wrote: “This answer misunderstands the
law, for unions may decline for a variety of reasons to pursue
potentially meritorious discrimination claims without suc-
cumbing to a member's suit for failure of fair
representation.”24
The Fifth Circuit in Ibarra v. United Parcel Service25 held
that because the CBA did not clearly and unmistakably
waive a union member's right to bring a Title VII claim in a
federal judicial forum, the district court erred when it
concluded that the CBA required Ibarra to submit her Title
VII claim to the Article 51 grievance process.26 The court
came to this conclusion after examining Article 51 and
Article 36 of the CBA. Article 51 describes grievance
procedures and denes a grievance as ‘‘any controversy, com-
plaint, misunderstanding or dispute arising as to interpreta-
tion, application or observance of any of the provisions of
this Agreement.’’ It provides that ‘‘any grievance, complaint,
or dispute’’ shall be handled in the manner specied in the
Article. The procedures culminated in submission of a griev-
ance to an arbitrator through the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, but only if the grievance ‘‘cannot be
satisfactorily settled by a majority decision of a panel of the
222009 WL 838159 at *21.
23See 2009 WL 838159.
242009 WL 838159, citing Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742 (“[E]ven if the
employee's claim were meritorious, his union might, without breaching its
duty of fair representation, reasonably and in good faith decide not to sup-
port the claim vigorously in arbitration”).
25Ibarra v. United Parcel Service, 116 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
20, 2012 WL 4017348 (5th Cir. 2012).
262012 WL 4017348, at *5.
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[Southern Regional Area Parcel Grievance Committee] and
Deadlock Panel.’’
Article 36 is a nondiscrimination provision. It stated:
The Employer and the Union agree not to discriminate against
any individual with respect to hiring, compensation, terms or
conditions of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, physi-
cal disability[,] veteran status or age in violation of any federal
or state law, or engage in any other discriminatory acts
prohibited by law, nor will they limit, segregate or classify em-
ployees in any way to deprive any individual employees of
employment opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, physical disability, veteran status or age in
violation of any federal or state law, or engage in any other
discriminatory acts prohibited by law. This Article also covers
employees with a qualied disability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
Noteworthy for the court, Article 36 mentioned no specic
federal or state statutes and made no reference to the griev-
ance procedures set forth in Article 51. The CBA contained
no express waiver of a judicial forum for claims brought pur-
suant to Title VII.
Relying on Penn Plaza and Gardner-Denver, conrmed for
the Fifth Circuit that the language of Article 51 and Article
36 was insucient to waive Ibarra's right to a judicial forum
for statutory discrimination claims. It recognized that the
Penn Plaza collective bargaining agreement clearly and
unmistakably waived union members right to pursue ADEA
claims in a judicial forum and futher included a nondiscrim-
ination provision that expressly provided for the arbitration
of claims brought pursuant to the ADEA and other federal
statutes. Like Article 36, the Penn Plaza provision stated
that the employer would not discriminate against the em-
ployee on the basis of any characteristic protected by law.27
However, unlike Article 36, the Penn Plaza provision
explicitly incorporated ‘‘claims made pursuant to . . . the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act’’ and specied that
such claims ‘‘shall be subject to the [CBA's] grievance and
arbitration procedure . . . as the sole and exclusive remedy
for violations,’’28 cross-referencing the relevant CBA articles.
27Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 252.
28Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56, 94 S. Ct. 1011,
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In Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency LLP,29 the Tenth
Circuit rejected a district court's nding that an arbitration
provision covering disputes regarding the contract applied to
an employee's statutory discrimination claims merely
because ‘‘actions or omissions that would otherwise consti-
tute statutory violations [were] also violations of [the]
agreement.’’ Mathews involved a collective bargaining agree-
ment that prohibited discrimination on various bases ‘‘in ac-
cordance with and as required by applicable state and federal
laws.’’30 The Tenth Circuit found that, even read in conjunc-
tion with the agreement's nondiscrimination provision, a
requirement that disputes regarding ‘‘interpretation, ap-
plication, or construction of the contract’’ be resolved through
arbitration was not sucient to waive an employee's right to
a judicial forum for his statutory discrimination claims,
explaining that ‘‘unionized employees . . . subjected to
discriminatory treatment hold two similar claims, one based
in statute, and one based in contract.’’31 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that to waive employees' rights to pursue statutory
discrimination claims in a judicial forum, an arbitration pro-
vision must ‘‘expressly grant[ ] the arbitrator authority to
decide statutory claims.’’32 Other courts have expressed simi-
lar views.33
39 L. Ed. 2d 147, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) P 9148 (1974).
29Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency LLP, 649 F.3d 1199, 24 A.D.
Cas. (BNA) 1156, 112 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 432, 190 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3053 (10th Cir. 2011) (revised opinion on grant of panel rehearing).
30649 F.3d at 1202.
31649 F.3d at 1206.
32649 F.3d at 1206 (citing Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 264, 129 S.Ct. at
1469; Wright, 525 U.S. at 70-80, 119 S.Ct. 391).
33See Cavallaro v. UMass Memorial Healthcare, Inc., 678 F.3d 1, 7 &
n.7, 193 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2019, 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1732, 162
Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10475 (1st Cir. 2012) (‘‘[S]everal Supreme Court cases
indicate that, at least where federal statutory claims are concerned, an
arbitration clause [in a collective bargaining agreement] can waive a
judicial forum . . . only if such waiver is ‘clear and unmistakable.' . . . A
broadly-worded arbitration clause . . . will not suce; rather something
closer to specic enumeration of statutory claims to be arbitrated is
required.’’ (citations omitted)); Powell v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 457 Fed.
Appx. 679, 680 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (‘‘We will not interpret a
CBA to waive an individual employee's right to litigate statutory
discrimination claims unless the CBA waiver ‘explicit[ly] incorporat[es]
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The Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver34
rejected an employer's argument that a Title VII race
discrimination claim should be barred because the aggrieved
employee already had arbitrated his discharge under the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. It held that
‘‘an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if
he rst pursues his grievance to nal arbitration under the
nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining
agreement.’’35 Thus, an agreement to arbitrate contained in a
union contract did not insulate an employer from statutory
claims of employment discrimination.
The Gilmer Court specically distinguished, not overruled,
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and its progeny,36 emphasizing
that the Alexander cases involved the issue of whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent
judicial resolution of the statutory claims where the statu-
tory claims are not within the scope of the labor arbitrator's
jurisdiction.37 In contrast, the Gilmer plainti, in a nonunion
setting, specically agreed to arbitrate all disputes, includ-
ing statutory claims.38 The Gilmer Court distinguished
Gardner-Denver on three grounds.
First, the Court again noted that an employee's contractual
rights under a collective bargaining agreement are distinct
from an employee's statutory rights. While an individual
employment contract may address both contractual and
statutory rights, a collective bargaining agreement may only
address the contractual rights of the members of the bargain
ing unit. Second, the Court noted that Gardner-Denver
. . . statutory antidiscrimination requirements.’ ’’ (citation omitted)).
34Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 147, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
¶ 9148 (1974).
35Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 1020,
39 L. Ed. 2d 147, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) P 9148 (1974).
36Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 101
S. Ct. 1437, 67 L. Ed. 2d 641, 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1284, 90 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 33990 (1981); McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466
U.S. 284, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 80 L. Ed. 2d 302, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3646, 34
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 34290 (1984).
37Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
38Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S. Ct.
1647, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1116, 56 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 40704 (1991).
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involved arbitration in a context of union representation
under a collective bargaining agreement, where there may
exist a tension between collective representation and indi-
vidual statutory rights.39 It expressed its continuing ‘‘concern
that in collective bargaining arbitration the interests of the
individual employee may be subordinated to the collective
interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.’’40 The Gilmer
Court ignored the potential paradox that a greater strain
may be placed on individual statutory rights in the Gilmer
context, where an unrepresented individual signs a predis-
pute arbitration agreement, than in the Alexander situation,
where an individual elects postdispute to invoke the power
of collective representation. Third, the Court noted that
Gardner-Denver and its progeny, unlike Gilmer, were not
decided under the FAA.
After Gilmer, where the employer sought to preclude statu-
tory claims based on prior arbitration of contractual issues
arising under a collective bargaining agreement, seven
courts of appeals ruled that general arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements do not bar employees from
ling law suits under antidiscrimination statutes.41 Only the
Fourth Circuit in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
39Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S. Ct.
1647, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1116, 56 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 40704 (1991).
40Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34, 111 S. Ct. at 1656, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26.
41Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213, 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1367 (8th Cir. 1996); Pryner v. Tractor Supply
Co., 109 F.3d 354, 20 A.D.D. 689, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 615, 154
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2806, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 45016, 133 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 11833 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Alexander holding that ‘‘the Union
cannot consent for the employee by signing a collective bargaining agree-
ment that consigns the enforcement of statutory rights to the union-
controlled grievance and arbitration machinery created by the agree-
ment’’); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1453, 73 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1384, 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2033, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) P 44689 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 524 U.S.
947, 118 S. Ct. 2364, 141 L. Ed. 2d 732, 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
576, 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2576 (1998) (adopting ‘‘the majority view. . .
Alexander and its progeny remain good law and that statutory employ-
ment claims are independent of a collective bargaining agreement's griev-
ance and arbitration procedures’’); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineer-
ing Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 23 A.D.D. 32, 6 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1878, 155
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2858 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that mandatory arbitration
clause does not bar litigation of federal statutory claim, unless three
requirements are met: (1) employee must have agreed individually to
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Inc.42 became the rst court of appeals to require arbitration
of a statutory discrimination claim under a collective
bargaining agreement. The Third Circuit upheld the exclusiv-
ity of the arbitration remedy in a collective bargaining agree-
ment case, but limited its holding to agreements which
empower the employee to pursue arbitration without the ap-
proval of the union, and which explicitly provide for arbitra-
tion of statutory discrimination claims, instead of only
contract claims.43
The Supreme Court in Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp.,44 unanimously held that the collective bargain-
ing agreement general arbitration clause did not require
Wright to use the arbitration procedure for alleged violation
of the ADA. Wright, a longshoreman, was subject to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and a Longshoreman Seniority
contract containing arbitration clause—union having agreed for employee
during collective bargaining does not count; (2) agree ment must authorize
arbitrator to resolve contract claims, even if factual issues arising from
those claims overlap with statutory claim issues; and (3) agreement must
give employee right to insist on arbitration if federal statutory claim is
not resolved to his/her satisfaction in any grievance process. None of the
requirements were met in this case, thus the district court's order compel-
ling arbitration was reversed.); Brown v. Trans World Airlines, 127 F.3d
337, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1675, 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2481, 71
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 45012, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 10069 (4th Cir.
1997); Penny v. United Parcel Service, 128 F.3d 408, 24 A.D.D. 744, 7 A.D.
Cas. (BNA) 718, 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2618, 1997 FED App. 0315P (6th
Cir. 1997) (Court of Appeals, [Lively, C.J.], held that: collective bargaining
agreement did not obligate employee to obtain judicial determination of
his ADA claims).
42Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 15
A.D.D. 166, 5 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 488, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 272,
151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2673, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43970, 152 A.L.R.
Fed. 699 (4th Cir. 1996).
43Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 421, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1803, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10015 (3d Cir.
1997), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 114 F.3d 428(July 1, 1997)
and order vacated, 124 F.3d 590114 F.3d 428, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 672, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2762, 134 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10016 (3d
Cir. 1997), order vacated, 124 F.3d 590, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1381, 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2604 (3d Cir. 1997), opinion after grant of
reh'g, 135 F.3d 765, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 871, 156 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3137 (3d Cir. 1997) and order vacated, 124 F.3d 590(Sept. 12,
1997), decisions withdrawn pending rehearing en banc.
44Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 119 S. Ct.
391, 142 L. Ed. 2d 361, 8 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1429, 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2769, 1999 A.M.C. 201 (1998).
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Plan, both of which contained an arbitration clause.45 When
the respondents failed to hire Wright following his settle-
ment for a claim for permanent disability benets for job-
related injuries, he led suit alleging violations of the ADA.
The district court dismissed because Wright failed to pursue
the arbitration procedure provided the CBA. The Fourth
Circuit armed.
The court noted that the Fourth Circuit's conclusions that
the CBA clause encompassed a statutory claim under the
ADA and was enforceable brought into focus the tension be-
45Clause 15(B) of the CBA between the Union and the SCSA provided
in part as follows: ‘‘Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly
settled between the Local and an individual Employer shall, no later than
48 hours after such discussion, be referred in writing covering the entire
grievance to a Port Grievance Committee . . ..’’ If the Port Grievance
Committee, which was evenly divided between representatives of labor
and management, could not reach an agreement within ve days of receiv
ing the complaint, then the dispute must be referred to a District Griev-
ance Committee, which was also evenly divided between the two sides.
The CBA provides that a majority decision of the District Grievance Com
mittee ‘‘shall be nal and binding.’’ If the District Grievance Committee
could not reach a majority decision within 72 hours after meeting, then
the committee must employ a professional arbitrator. Clause 15(F) of the
CBA provided as follows:
The Union agrees that this Agreement is intended to cover all matters aecting
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and that during
the term of this Agreement the Employers will not be required to negotiate on
any further matters aecting these or other subjects not specically set forth in
this Agreement. Anything not contained in this Agreement shall not be
construed as being part of this Agreement. All past port practices being
observed may be reduced to writing in each port.
Finally, Clause 17 of the CBA stated: ‘‘It is the intention and purpose of
all parties hereto that no provision or part of this Agreement shall be
violative of any Federal or State Law.’’
Wright was also subject to the Longshore Seniority Plan, which
contained its own grievance provision, reading as follows: ‘‘Any dispute
concerning or arising out of the terms and/or conditions of this Agree-
ment, or dispute involving the interpretation or application of this Agree
ment, or dispute arising out of any rule adopted for its implementation,
shall be referred to the Seniority Board.’’ The Seniority Board was equally
divided between labor and management representatives. If the board
reached agreement by majority vote, then that determination was nal
and binding. If the board could not resolve the dispute, then the Union
and the SCSA each choose a person, and this ‘‘Committee of two’’ makes a
nal determination. For subsequent history, see Local 1422, Intern.
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. South Carolina Stevedores Ass'n, 170 F.3d 407,
160 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2701, 137 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10380, 1999 A.M.C.
1871 (4th Cir. 1999) (union's action to compel arbitration on behalf of
Wright was timely).
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tween two lines of the court's case law—the Gardner-Denver
and the Gilmer decisions. However, the question of the va-
lidity of a union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory
rights to a federal forum was not resolved in Wright. Instead,
the Court announced, without deciding whether Gardner-
Denver’s ‘‘seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of
employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer,’’ that in or-
der for a union to waive employees' statutory antidiscrimina-
tion claims, the agreement to arbitrate such claims must be
‘‘clear and unmistakable.’’ In Wright, the CBA's arbitration
clause was very general, providing only for arbitration of
‘‘[m]atters under dispute,’’ there was no explicit incorpora-
tion of statutory antidiscrimination requirements in the
remainder of the CBA. The Court held that the CBA in Wright
failed to contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of covered
employees' rights to a judicial forum for federal claims of
employment discrimination. It did not reach the question
whether such a waiver would be enforceable.
The Second Circuit addressed an election of remedies ques-
tion choice where the collective bargaining agreement
provided that members raising EEO claims had to choose to
either arbitrate their claims through the CBA grievance
procedures or proceed before the state human rights agency.46
The union refused to arbitrate a discrimination claim that
had been led by a union member with the state agency.
The Second Circuit upheld the enforceability of the CBA's
election of remedies provision and rejected the claim that
the union's failure to pursue arbitration constituted retalia-
tion under Title VII.
Most post-Wright courts continued to follow the Gardner-
Denver paradigm in considering statutory claims raised by
employees subject to collectively bargained grievance reme-
dies, holding that the contractual grievance machinery was
insucient to establish a ‘‘clear and unmistakable waiver’’ of
statutory rights.47 These decisions addressed claims under
46Richardson v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 532
F.3d 114, 103 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 156 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
¶ 11081 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 56, 175 L. Ed. 2d 232, 107
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 672 (2009).
47For an excellent discussion of Gardner-Denver and Wright, and the
lower courts subsequent application, see Mary K. O'Melveny, One Bite of
the Apple and One of the Orange: Interpreting Claims that Collective
Bargaining Agreements Should Waive the Individual Employee'sStatutory
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Title VII,48 the Americans with Disabilities Act,49 the Family
and Medical Leave Act,50 the ADEA,51 and other statutes.52
Rights, in Labor Lawyer, Fall, 2003.
48See, e.g., LaCanne v. AAF McQuay, Inc., 168 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2870,
2001 WL 1344217 (D. Minn. 2001); Paris v. Dallas Airmotive, Inc., 130 F.
Supp. 2d 844, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2001); E.E.O.C. v. International Ass'n of
Fireghters, Local 109, 88 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 894, 2000 WL
33739179 (S.D. Ohio 2000); but see Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d
306, 308, 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 833, 167 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2070
(4th Cir. 2001); Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 335-36, 82 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1681, 164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2388 (E.D. N.Y. 2000);
Osuala v. Community College of Philadelphia, 2000 WL 1146623 (E.D. Pa.
2000), judgment a'd, 259 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 2001).
49See, e.g., Rogers v. New York University, 220 F.3d 73, 76-77, 146
Ed. Law Rep. 75, 164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2854, 6 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA)
379, 78 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 40131, 141 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 10768,
141 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 34124 (2d Cir. 2000) (abrogated by, 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 173 L. Ed. 2d 398, 105 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1441, 186 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2065, 92 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P
43507, 157 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 11208 (2009)) (per curiam); Martin v.
Barnesville Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 209 F.3d 931, 10
A.D. Cas. (BNA) 787, 143 Ed. Law Rep. 731, 2000 FED App. 0142P (6th
Cir. 2000); Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 653-54, 10
A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1176, 164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2609, 2000 FED App. 0203P
(6th Cir. 2000); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 8, 9 A.D. Cas.
(BNA) 242 (1st Cir. 1999); Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc., 183 F.3d
319, 322, 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2769 (4th Cir. 1999); Bratten v. SSI Services,
Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 632, 9 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1045, 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2985, 1999 FED App. 0268P (6th Cir. 1999); Collins v. Michelin North
America, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 909, 164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2505 (N.D. Ind.
1999).
50See, e.g., Rogers, 220 F.3d at 76; Hess v. Anheuser-Busch Companies,
Inc., 2002 WL 483564 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Neppl v. Signature Flight Support
Corp., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1024-25, 84 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 41375,
147, 147 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 34676 (D. Minn. 2002); Bonilla v. Small
Assemblies Co., 8 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 373, 80 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) ¶ 40609, 143 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 34276, 2001 WL 630969 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
51See, e.g., Fowler v. Colfax Envelope Corp., 2002 WL 1676568 (N.D.
Ill. 2002); Jupiter v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 1999 WL 1009829
(E.D. La. 1999) (federal and state age discrimination claims not included
in contractual grievance and arbitration clause).
52See, e.g., Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 322, 170
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2173 (2d Cir. 2002) (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983); Barnica v. Kenai
Peninsula Borough School Dist., 46 P.3d 974, 997-80, 165 Ed. Law Rep.
342, 88 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1199, 169 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3270
(Alaska 2002) (Alaska Human Rights Act, Alaska Stat. § 18.80.220 [Michie
2002]); Fayer v. Town of Middlebury, 258 F.3d 117, 123, 144 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 59390 (2d Cir. 2001) (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983); Scheiner v. New York
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Post-Wright courts examined the explicit language of the
collective bargaining agreements (CBA) in evaluating
defense motions to dismiss and/or to compel arbitration of
statutory claims in the unionized workforce. Frequently,
more than one CBA provision relates to the waiver issue.53
Most CBA's contains some form of grievance and arbitration
process for the resolution of contractual disputes. Courts
agree that no waiver will be found unless such clauses
explicitly and specically incorporate statutory nondiscrimi-
nation protections.54 A general clause referring to the arbitra-
tion of ‘‘all disputes’’ under the contract or providing that
City Health and Hospitals, 152 F. Supp. 2d 487, 498, 144 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
¶ 59413 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and New York whistleblower
statute, N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law, § 75-b); Fowler v. Transit Super. Org., 84
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 322, 2000 WL 1726687 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (42
U.S.C.A. § 1981); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 430, 436, 95
Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 298, 82 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1143, 164 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2142 (2d Dist. 2000) (California Fair Employment & Housing Act,
Cal. Gov't. Code §§ 12940 et seq.).
53The Fourth Circuit noted in Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d
325, 331, 79 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 976, 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2129,
75 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 45847 (4th Cir. 1999), Wright suggested that
the matter may be resolved by one of two separate approaches: (1) ‘‘draft-
ing an explicit arbitration clause [providing that] employees agree to
submit to arbitration all federal causes of action arising out of their
employment’’ or (2) drafting ‘‘'an explicit incorporation of statutory anti-
discrimination requirements' elsewhere in the contract.’’
54See Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 322 to 23 (general CBA grievance/
arbitration clause could not waive employee's Fourteenth Amendment
rights); Fayer, at 117, 121 to 23 (general grievance provision pertaining to
‘‘all disputes’’ cannot waive First Amendment rights); Rogers, 220 F.3d at
76; Carson, 175 F.3d at 331 to 32 (general arbitration clauses such as
those referring to ‘‘all disputes’’ do not, taken alone, meet the Wright stan-
dard); Fowler v. Colfax Envelope Corp., 2002 WL 1676568 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(blanket arbitration provision did not incorporate ADEA claims); Neppl v.
Signature Flight Support Corp., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1023-1025, 84
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 41375, 147 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 34676 (D. Minn.
2002) (reference to FMLA procedures in CBA did not incorporate Act into
CBA's arbitration clause); Fowler v. Transit Super. Org., 84 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 322, 2000 WL 1726687 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (§§ 1981 and
1983 claims not barred by general arbitration clause of CBA); Vasquez, 95
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433-36, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 296-99 (general arbitration
clause, read together with nondiscrimination clause, failed to contain ex-
plicit waiver of federal ADA claims or state FEHA claims). See, generally,
Jacob E. Tyler, Mandatory Arbitration of Discrimination Claims Under
Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Eect of Wright, 4 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 253 n.59 (discussing various circuit court decisions ad-
dressing waiver issue).
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arbitration is intended to resolve all disputes ‘‘concerning
the interpretation, application, or claimed violation of a
specic term or provision of [the] Agreement’’ is insucient.55
The grievance and arbitration clause must be considered
together with other CBA provisions.
Virtually all CBAs contain some form of nondiscrimination
clause, promising that employees will not be subject to
discrimination.56 Many employers argue that an employee's
statutory rights are waived because the CBA contains
language prohibiting discrimination by the employer and the
union against employees falling within various protected
classes. Unless the nondiscrimination clause identies the
particular statutes by name or citation and clearly indicates
the parties' intention to fully incorporate such statutes into
the contract, including the pertinent statutory remedies,
courts decline to nd waiver.57 Examples of language found
insucient are discussed by a number of courts.58
55Rogers, 220 F.3d at 76; Beason v. United Technologies Corp.,
Hamilton Standard Div., 37 F. Supp. 2d 127, 129-31, 164 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2372 (D. Conn. 1999) (arbitration clause that required arbitration of
‘‘contractual disputes’’ and did not mention statutory claims did not eect
waiver); Jupiter v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 1999 WL 1009829
(E.D. La. 1999) (CBA provision requiring arbitration of ‘‘any controversy’’
under the CBA and failing to incorporate specic statutory nondiscrimina-
tion requirements does not constitute clear and unmistakable waiver).
56See N. Peter Lareau, Drafting The Union Contract: A Handbook
For The Management Negotiator, § 5A-10 (1998) (reporting estimates that
94% of all CBAs contain nondiscrimination clauses) (cited in Hodges,
Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized Workplace: Is Bargain-
ing with the Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 513,
524-25, and n.69 (2001)).
57See, e.g., Bratten v. SSI Services, Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 630-32, 9 A.D.
Cas. (BNA) 1045, 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2985, 1999 FED App. 0268P (6th
Cir. 1999) (no ADA waiver based on inclusion of ‘‘disability’’ or ‘‘handicap’’
in general antidiscrimination provision); Birch v. The Pepsi Bottling
Group, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 376, 170 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2004 (D. Md. 2002)
(same); Paris, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 847-48 (CBA clause provided that union
and company agreed ‘‘to comply with all statutes and laws prohibiting
discrimination [and] all other antidiscrimination in employment statutes
applicable to the parties’’ and to adopt ‘‘as part of the Agreement’’ and
give eect to any ‘‘amended governmental statutes and regulations
pertaining to nondiscrimination’’); Osuala v. Community College of Phila-
delphia, 2000 WL 1146623 (E.D. Pa. 2000), judgment a'd, 259 F.3d 717
(3d Cir. 2001) (CBA's general nondiscrimination clause did not aect
waiver of individual's Title VII claims); Jupiter v. Bellsouth Telecom-
munications, Inc., 1999 WL 1009829 (E.D. La. 1999) (federal and state
§ 13:17Defendant’s Motion
17
34
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 11 [2016], Art. 63
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss11/63
One court concluded that statutory claims rights were
incorporated into the CBA. It based its holding on the fol-
lowing language: ‘‘[The parties] agree that they will not dis-
criminate against any employee with regard to race, color
. . .. [and] that they will abide by all the requirements of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.’’59 The court stated
age discrimination claims not included in contractual grievance and
arbitration clause); Collins, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 911-12 (CBA provision stat-
ing that company ‘‘may take any action necessary to comply.”
58One nondiscrimination clause provided as follows: ‘‘Both parties ac-
knowledge their respective obligations under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act and agree that neither will discriminate against any employee or ap-
plicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, age, veteran
status, disability or national origin.’’ Birch, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 382-84
(holding that reference to Title VII in contract was ‘‘not suciently ex-
plicit to waive’’ plainti's ADA claim, particularly since the contract did
‘‘not identify the ADA in any way’’). See also Brown, 183 F.3d at 322 (nd-
ing that a similar nondiscrimination clause could not waive statutory
rights). Such a clause ‘‘constitute[s] merely an ‘agreement not to commit
discriminatory acts' rather than an ‘agreement to incorporate, in toto, the
antidiscrimination statutes that prohibit those acts.’’' Brown, 183 F.3d at
322 at 320. Another clause provided that ‘‘[t]here shall be no discrimina-
tion as dened by applicable Federal, New York State, and New York City
laws, against any present or future employee by reason of . . . physical or
mental disability’’ and that ‘‘employees are entitled to all provisions of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 . . . that are not specically
provided for in this agreement.’’ It was held inadequate to bar the employ-
ee's ADA and FMLA claims. Rogers, 220 F.3d at 74. These provisions did
not meet the Wright requirement of ‘‘explicit’’ incorporation of statutory
claims, including statutory remedies, because they were not conferring
benets that were ‘‘coextensive with the federal statutory right.’’ Rogers v.
New York University, 220 F.3d 73, 76, 146 Ed. Law Rep. 75, 164 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2854, 6 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 379, 78 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) P 40131, 141 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10768, 141 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P
34124 (2d Cir. 2000) (abrogated by, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.
Ct. 1456, 173 L. Ed. 2d 398, 105 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1441, 186
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2065, 92 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43507, 157 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) P 11208 (2009)) at 76 (citing, Wright, 525 U.S. at 79). See also
Neddl, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1019-24 and n.13 (holding that referring to
FMLA regulations and other guidance in CBA did not incorporate the Act
into contract for dispute resolution purposes, and reviewing various
authorities); Collins, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 910-11 (CBA language stating that
‘‘Company may take any action necessary to comply with the [ADA]’’ and
providing that ‘‘if the parties cannot otherwise resolve any dispute regard-
ing the ADA ‘the matter may be submitted to the grievance and arbitra-
tion process . . .’ ’’ did not eectuate waiver; term ‘‘may’’ leaves open issue
of whether employees are informed that they cannot enforce ADA rights
in court).
59Rogers v. New York University, 220 F.3d 73, 76, 146 Ed. Law Rep.
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it was ‘‘hard to imagine a waiver that would be more denite
or absolute.’’60
Courts considered waiver or preclusion issues in the
context of claims arising under one specic statute, such as
the ADA, where the CBA provision made specic reference
to another, such as Title VII. Most courts rejected explicit
incorporation of a statutory scheme simply because the
clause references protected a status such as ‘‘disability’’ but
not the ADA or other statute itself.61
In one case, neither the arbitration clause nor the general
nondiscrimination clause contained denitive waiver lan
guage; however, the court examined a separate clause, which
prohibited sexual harassment and set forth express
grievance-handling methods for resolving such claims, and
75, 164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2854, 6 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 379, 78
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 40131, 141 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 10768, 141 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) P 34124 (2d Cir. 2000) (abrogated by, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 173 L. Ed. 2d 398, 105 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1441, 186 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2065, 92 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P
43507, 157 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 11208 (2009)) at 76 (citing, Wright, 525
U.S. at 79). See also Neddl, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 1019-24 and n.13 (holding
that referring to FMLA regulations and other guidance in CBA did not
incorporate Act into contract for dispute resolution purposes and review-
ing various authorities); Collins, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 910-11 (CBA language
stating that ‘‘Company may take any action necessary to comply with the
[ADA]’’ and providing that ‘‘if the parties cannot otherwise resolve any
dispute regarding the ADA ‘the matter may be submitted to the grievance
and arbitration process . . ."' did not eectuate waiver; term ‘‘may’’ leaves
open issue of whether employees are informed that they cannot enforce
ADA rights in court).
60Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308, 85 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 833, 167 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2070 (4th Cir. 2001) at 308. The
Court's ruling was based on Fourth Circuit precedent holding that ‘‘a col-
lectively bargained agreement to arbitrate a statutory discrimination
claim is enforceable.’’ Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308, 85
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 833, 167 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2070 (4th Cir.
2001) (citing Brown, 183 F.3d at 321; Carson, 175 F.3d at 331). Similarly,
another Fourth Circuit case, Singletary v. Enersys, Inc., 57 Fed. Appx. 161
(4th Cir. 2003), held that a waiver was eectuated by the following
language in a nondiscrimination clause: ‘‘Any and all claims regarding
equal employment opportunity or provided for under this Article of the
Agreement or under any federal or state employment law shall be
exclusively addressed by an individual employee or the Union under the
grievance and arbitration provisions of this Agreement.’’
61See, e.g., Bratten, 185 F.3d at 627-28, 631-32 (CBA provision stat-
ing that parties would ‘‘comply with Executive Order 11246 and Title VII’’
and that they would not discriminate based on ‘‘disability or handicap’’
insucient to incorporate ADA claims).
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concluded that this particular language should be construed
as requiring plaintis to arbitrate their harassment claims
under the contract rather than pursue them in court.62 One
decision did set forth specic guidance on what is required to
demonstrate an enforceable waiver in the Fourth Circuit.63
The evidentiary value of arbitration rulings is another
possible argument to impose a waiver. Neither Gardner-
Denver nor Wright resolved the question of what weight, if
any, should be given to those arbitration decisions that do
consider an employee's discrimination claim. Even where the
CBA has not clearly and unmistakably waived statutory as-
sertion of such claims, some courts have accorded preclusive,
or at least highly deferential, weight to these rulings. One
New York district court, for example, gave preclusive eect
to the arbitrator's ruling against plaintis asserting sexual
harassment claims because the arbitration process had been
fair and provided signicant procedural protections that it
viewed as comparable to those available in a judicial
proceeding.64 A Connecticut district court refused to hold
that a plainti's ADA and Connecticut FEP claims were
barred by a prior arbitrator's ruling, citing Gardner-Denver's
analysis of the ‘‘comparatively inferior’’ arbitration process
and the dangers that the union and the individual might not
have the same ‘‘harmony of interest.’’65 However, most courts
continue to reject claims that individual employees should
62Clark, 98 F. Supp. 2d at at 323, 332-336 (according preclusive eect
to prior arbitration decision denying plaintis' sexual harassment claims
in subsequent Title VII and New York Human Rights Act claims).
63Carson, 175 F.3d at 331-32. The court stated:
The CBA must contain a clear and unmistakable provision under which the
employees agree to submit to arbitration all federal causes of action arising out
of their employment. Such a clear arbitration clause will suce to bind the
parties to arbitrate claims arising under a host of federal statutes, including
Title VII.
64Clarke, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 323, 332-37. The court looked carefully at
the arbitration process and concluded that it had been both fair and
adequate. Among the items cited by the court in reaching its decision
were that the arbitration hearing took place over ve days, the rules of ev-
idence had been applied, and a written transcript was made of the
proceedings. In addition, testimony was given under oath and subjected to
cross-examination, and ‘‘all parties had broad rights of discovery and
compulsory process, pursuant to a provision of the CBA.’’ Clarke v. UFI,
Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 334-35, 82 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1681,
164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2388 (E.D. N.Y. 2000) at 334-35.
65Beason, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 131-33 (arbitration ruling denied union's
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be bound by prior arbitration proceedings where the issues
raised were not coextensive with the statutory guarantees
raised in the lawsuit. These decisions also look carefully at
the procedural dierences between arbitration and
litigation.66
In Carson v. Giant Food, Inc.67 current and former African-
American employees of the supermarket food chain Giant
Food led suit claiming that Giant and its ocers and
managers discriminated against employees on the basis of
race, age, and disability. They alleged numerous individual
and class claims, including claims under Title VII, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In
response, defendants asserted that four dierent unions,
which had entered into four dierent Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBAs), represented the named plaintis.
Defendants argued that each of those CBAs required the
arbitration of employee statutory discrimination claims.
They based their argument on two clauses—a nondiscrimi-
nation clause and an arbitration clause—that appear in each
CBA.68 In addition to the nondiscrimination provisions, the
four CBAs also contain arbitration clauses dening the scope
grievance that company violated ADA by failing to recall plainti and
other employees; court rejected argument that Gilmer required it to ac-
cept the award, noting that Wright rearmed notion that, absent individ-
ual waiver, judicial forum rights remained important). The court also held
that a Connecticut statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51bb (West 1997), al-
lowed employees to assert statutory rights in a court action despite a prior
adverse determination of the same claim under a CBA. Beason v. United
Technologies Corp., Hamilton Standard Div., 37 F. Supp. 2d 127, 132, 164
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2372 (D. Conn. 1999) at 132.
66See, e.g., Shtab, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 260-63 (declining to give
preclusive eect in FMLA lawsuit to arbitration award addressing leave
denials under CBA and discussing cases); also see infra note 178; Beason,
37 F. Supp. 2d at 131-33; Tout v. County of Erie, 1998 WL 683770 (W.D.
N.Y. 1998); Slaughter, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 329-31 (dismissing armative
defense of collateral estoppel, nding that issues resolved in grievance
hearing and arbitration were distinct from those involved in FMLA action).
67Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 79 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 976, 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2129, 75 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 45847
(4th Cir. 1999).
68The nondiscrimination provisions in the four CBAs are similar. The
CBA negotiated by the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Lo-
cal 400, includes a clause in the preamble:
§ 13:17Defendant’s Motion
21
38
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 11 [2016], Art. 63
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss11/63
of arbitrable matters.69 Defendants moved for summary judg-
ment, asserting that the language of these agreements.
Applying the ‘‘clear and unmistakable’’ test set out in
Wright, the court found that the broad, general language in
the CBA's was not sucient to meet the level of clarity
required to eect a waiver in a CBA. In the collective
bargaining context, the court noted that the parties ‘‘must be
particularly clear’’ about their intent to arbitrate statutory
discrimination claims. Here, the parties were not that clear.
The Fourth Circuit read the Supreme Court's opinion in
Wright as indicating that the requisite degree of clarity can
be achieved by two dierent approaches. The rst simply
involves drafting an explicit arbitration clause. Under this
approach, the CBA must contain a clear and unmistakable
provision under which the employees agree to submit to
arbitration all federal causes of action arising out of their
employment. The second approach is applicable when the
arbitration clause is not so clear. ‘‘General arbitration
clauses, such as those referring to ‘all disputes' or ‘all
disputes concerning the interpretation of the agreement,'
taken alone do not meet the clear and unmistakable require-
ment of Universal Maritime.’’ Therefore, the court ruled that
when the parties use such broad but nonspecic language in
the arbitration clause, they must include an ‘‘explicit
incorporation of statutory antidiscrimination requirements’’
elsewhere in the contract. If another provision, like a non-
discrimination clause, makes it unmistakably clear that the
discrimination statutes at issue are part of the agreement,
employees will be bound to arbitrate their federal claims.
Since the CBAs in this case failed to follow either approach,
the arbitration clauses in the CBA's did not commit to
arbitration the resolution of the employees' federal statutory
discrimination claims.
WHEREAS, the Employer and the Union in the performance of this
Agreement agree not to discriminate against any employee or applicant
for employment because of race, color, religious creed, origin, age or sex.
69The CBAs for Locals 639, 730, and 922 each state that [S]hould any
grievance or dispute arise between the parties regarding the terms of this
Agreement, [the parties will try to resolve the matter]. . . . If agreement
cannot be reached, the parties agree that within ve (5) days they shall
select a neutral and impartial arbitrator . . .. The arbitration clause
negotiated by Local 400 is slightly dierent, requiring arbitration of any
‘‘controversy, dispute or disagreement . . . concerning the interpretation
of the provisions of this Agreement.’’
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The Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Board of Governors of
State Colleges & Universities,70 held that Section 4(d) of the
ADEA71 prohibits a collective bargaining agreement that
provides that grievances will proceed to arbitration only if
the employee refrains from exercising rights under the
ADEA. The court noted that the Gilmer court distinguished
its holding from cases ‘‘occurring in the context of collective
bargaining agreements.’’72 Other courts of appeals addressed
arbitration clauses in CBA's.73
In New England Health Care Employees Union, Dist. 1199,
SEIU, AFL-CIO v. Rhode Island Legal Services (the Union)74
the Union and Rhode Island Legal Services (‘‘RILS’’) are par-
ties to a collective bargaining agreement (‘‘the CBA’’). Among
the CBA's many provisions is Article 20.3(f), which provides
that ‘‘RILS shall not be required to arbitrate any dispute
which is pending before any administrative or judicial
70E.E.O.C. v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities,
957 F.2d 424, 73 Ed. Law Rep. 360, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 292,
58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 41326 (7th Cir. 1992).
7129 U.S.C.A. § 623(d).
72EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colls. & Univs., 957 F.2d at
431 (citing 111 S. Ct. at 675).
73Rogers v. New York University, 220 F.3d 73, 146 Ed. Law Rep. 75,
164 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2854, 6 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 379, 78 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 40131, 141 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 10768, 141 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 34124 (2d Cir. 2000) (abrogated by, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
129 S. Ct. 1456, 173 L. Ed. 2d 398, 105 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1441,
186 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2065, 92 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 43507, 157 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) P 11208 (2009)) (arbitration on a discharged employee's FMLA
claim not compelled when agreement does not specically make compli-
ance with the FMLA a contractual commitment that is subject to the
arbitration clause); Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 161
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2769 (4th Cir. 1999) (court ruled that one clause in a
CBA that ran nearly parallel to the language of some federal antidiscrim-
ination statute, Title VII and the ADA specically, and to arguably pro-
hibit some of the same conduct was insucient to constitute a waiver
without explicit incorporation of the statutory materials); Kennedy v.
Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 10 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1176, 164
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2609, 2000, 2000 FED App. 0203P (6th Cir. 2000) (court
ruled no res judicata bar to ADA claim when nothing in the collective
bargaining agreement precluded plainti from pursuing an ADA claim in
federal court and plainti's agreement to arbitrate did not waive his
substantive rights aorded to him under the ADA).
74New England Health Care Employees Union, Dist. 1199, SEIU,
AFL-CIO v. Rhode Island Legal Services, 273 F.3d 425, 168 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2961, 145 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 11172 (1st Cir. 2001).
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agency.’’ RILS terminated a Union member and the Union
led a grievance on the employee's behalf, pursuant to the
CBA, alleging that he was terminated because of a disability.
Four months later, the employee led discrimination
complaints with the Rhode Island Commission on Human
Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
alleging that RILS terminated her because she is physically
disabled. The Union's grievance proceeded to arbitration,
and the arbitrator found it was substantively non-arbitrable
under Article 20.3(f) because the employee's administrative
complaints were still pending. After the Union petitioned
the district court to vacate the arbitrator's award, the district
court upheld the award and granted summary judgment in
the Union's favor.
The First Circuit reviewed the district court's legal
determinations de novo, and applied the standard cited in
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of
America, Dist. 17,75 for evaluating an arbitrator's decision in
the CBA context:
. . . both employer and union have granted to the arbitrator
the authority to interpret the meaning of their contract's
language, including such words as ‘just cause.' They have
‘bargained for' the ‘arbitrator's construction' of their
agreement. And courts will set aside the arbitrator's interpre-
tation of what their agreement means only in rare instances.
Of course, an arbitrator's award ‘must draw its essence from
the contract and cannot simply reect the arbitrator's own no-
tions of industrial justice.' ‘But as long as [an honest] arbitra-
tor is even arguably construing or applying the contract and
acting within the scope of his authority,' the fact that ‘a court
is convinced he committed serious error does not suce to
overturn his decision.' The court noted that a challenge to an
arbitrator's interpretation of an agreement can be successful
only if the losing party meets the exceedingly strict standard
of review by showing that the award is: ‘‘(1) unfounded in rea-
son and fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no
judge, or group of judges, ever could conceivably have made
75Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America,
Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62, 121 S. Ct. 462, 148 L. Ed. 2d 354, 16 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 1633, 165 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2865, 142 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 10842
(2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted) citing United Steelwork-
ers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, 80 S.
Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424, 46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2423, 40 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
¶ 66630 (1960) and United Paperworkers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S. Ct. 364, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3113, 107 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 10165 (1987).
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such a ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial assumption
that is concededly a non-fact.’’ The court held that ‘‘even as-
suming that public policy favors arbitration, we may not sup-
plant the parties' arms-length agreement and require RILS to
submit to arbitration here. Finding no explicit, well-dened
and dominant public policy to require a party to arbitrate
claims it has agreed not to arbitrate, our inquiry comes to an
end.’’
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